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Note:
This article was developed 
from a paper delivered at 
the Koers-75 Conference on 
‘Worldview and Education’, 
held in Potchefstroom, South 
Africa, from 30 May to 02 
June 2011.
Hierdie artikel is ‘n verdere 
ontwikkeling van ‘n 
voordrag gelewer by die 
Koers-75 Konferensie oor 
‘Worldview and Education’ 
in Potchefstroom, Suid-
Afrika, vanaf 30 Mei tot 02 
Junie 2011.
Commemorating the 75-year existence of the journal Koers is connected to the Reformational 
tradition, from Calvin to Kuyper, Stoker, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven – all thinkers who 
realised that the biblical starting point of life indeed touches the heart, the religious root, of 
humankind and therefore cannot remain restricted to church life and religion in its narrow 
sense, but must come to expression in all walks of life. This awareness was a fruit of the 
Christian worldview and lifeview which currently is confronted by the Big Bang claims 
and by neo-Darwinism – both movements taking on cultic dimensions with an intolerance 
towards everyone who does not accept their perspective. Their attitude generated serious 
reactions on two websites, the impact of which was discussed in this article. Some problems 
entailed in Darwinism and physicalistic materialism were highlighted, before attention was 
given to the status of natural laws and normative principles. Particular attention was given 
to the elimination of God’s law and the way in which modern Humanism explored the two 
cornerstones of modern nominalism, up to the point where human understanding was 
elevated to become the a priori formal law-giver of nature. This legacy was continued both by 
the later developments within the Baden school of neo-Kantian thought and Postmodernism, 
which is placed within the context of the three succeeding epistemic ideals of the past three 
centuries. Rationality can only fulfil its true calling when it accounts for the cohering diversity 
within reality without becoming a victim of any form of reductionism – and by following this 
guiding star, Koers will continue to strengthen its invaluable contribution to the advancement 
of Christian scholarship.
© 2012. The Authors.
Licensee: AOSIS 
OpenJournals. This work
is licensed under the
Creative Commons
Attribution License.
Introduction
Commemorating the 75-year existence of the journal Koers most certainly deserved a special 
conference. The request to respond at the end of this conference enabled an overview of the 
presentations and discussions that took place during the Conference and it also once more invited 
a reflection on the central ideal of Christian scholarship and the place of our Christian worldview 
in it – focused on the ultimate concern for advancing scholarship from the perspective of a non-
reductionist ontology (as will be explained below).
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Koers en die ideaal van Christelike wetenskap. Die 75-jarige herdenking van die bestaan van 
die tydskrif Koers is verbind aan die reformatoriese tradisie vanaf Calvyn tot by Kuyper, Stoker, 
Dooyeweerd en Vollenhoven, almal denkers wat besef het dat die Bybelse uitgangspunt van die 
lewe die hart as religieuse wortel van die mens se bestaan raak en daarom nie tot die sfeer van 
die kerk en godsdiens in enger sin beperk kan bly nie – dit moet inderdaad in alle sektore van 
die lewe deurwerk. Hierdie besef is die vrug van die Christelike lewens- en wêreldbeskouing 
wat tans gekonfronteer word deur die Big Bang-aansprake en deur die neo-Darwinisme – beide 
bewegings wat kulties-godsdienstige vorme aanneem en wat intolerant is teenoor elkeen wat 
nie hul perspektief aanvaar nie. Hierdie instelling het ernstige reaksie op twee webtuistes 
ontlok. Sommige probleme wat in die Darwinisme en die fisikalistiese materialisme vervat is 
word belig alvorens aandag aan die status van natuurwette en normatiewe beginsels gegee 
word. Besondere aandag word geskenk aan die eliminering van God se wet en aan die wyse 
waarop die moderne Humanisme twee van die grondpilare van die moderne nominalisme 
ontglip het, tot op die punt waar die menslike verstand tot die apriories-formele wetgewer van 
die natuur verhef is. Hierdie erfenis is gekontinueer beide deur die latere ontwikkelinge in die 
neo-Kantiaanse Badense skool en in die postmodernisme, geplaas teen die agtegrond van die 
drie opeenvolgende kennisideale van die afgelope drie eeue. Rasionaliteit kan slegs die ware 
roeping daarvan vervul indien dit rekenskap gee van die samehangende verskeidenheid in 
die skepping sonder om die slagoffer van enige vorm van reduksionisme te word. Wanneer 
Koers hierdie leidster volg sal dit daarmee voortgaan om ŉ waardevolle en onmisbare bydrae 
te bly lewer ten bate van die bevordering van Christelike wetenskap.
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By the end of the 19th century, Kuyper realised that the 
Reformation of the 16th century had indeed touched the 
heart, the religious root, of humankind and therefore could 
not remain restricted to church life and religion in its narrow 
sense, but must come to expression in all walks of life. This 
realisation emerged within the immediacy of everyday life 
and the threat which the idea of an objective and neutral 
scholarship entailed for the freedom of Christians within 
the academic world. Establishing the Vrije Universiteit in 
Amsterdam in 1880 was therefore a fruit of the Christian life 
and worldview – the ideal of Christian scholarship did not 
derive from scholarship itself but from the non-theoretical 
starting point of the Christian life and worldview. Kuyper 
aimed to create a university free from the interference of 
both Church and State. At the moment, Western culture 
experiences once more a situation in which the Christian life 
and worldview is threatened by non-Christian orientations.
Within the sphere of public opinion, largely informed by 
newspapers, popular magazines and journals and, of course, 
television, we are currently once again confronted with 
a worldview which challenges Christians in the name of 
scholarship and solid science. The Big Bang theory pretends 
to ‘solve’ the mystery of creation by means of a physical 
theory and neo-Darwinism dominates the public sphere 
with its pretended scientific (biological) approach to an 
understanding of the world. These realities call Christians to 
respond with intellectual integrity and scholarly expertise.
Accomplishing this task inevitably encompasses an account 
of the place and nature of humankind within the universe 
and, of necessity, it leads us to consider boundary questions 
that are directed at the ultimate horizon of our experience 
of the universe. Creaturely reality is not self-sufficient, it 
is not autonomous or independent, because every creature 
is fitted in an unbreakable coherence with other creatures. 
This insight accounts for the relativity of creaturely reality 
without falling prey to an unbridled relativism. This relativity 
rather accentuates the relatedness of creatures, the coherence of 
everything with everything else. Yet coherence is just the one 
side of the coin – uniqueness constitutes the other side. And 
uniqueness is dependent upon demarcation and delimitation 
which, in turn, manifests the determining role of creational 
laws – also setting limits to what we can experience. The 
creaturely mode of existence is one of being subjected to 
God’s determining and delimiting laws. In a similar manner 
to the way in which the horizon of our visual field constitutes 
the limit of what we can see, the contours of God’s law 
constitute the ultimate horizon of human experience.
Insofar as these questions concern the limits of our experience, 
various academic disciplines pretended to be able to provide 
the ultimate answers at stake. Traditionally, theology fulfilled 
a prominent role in this regard, but with the emancipation 
of rationality since the Renaissance, mathematics and 
mathematical physics increasingly assumed an equally 
notable role, particularly since the rise of the Big Bang theory. 
And, even earlier, since 1859, certain trends of thought in 
biology and related disciplines increasingly believed that 
the natural sciences can account for everything – from 
atoms and molecules up to human beings. Already during 
the 1960s of the previous century, the biochemist Jevons 
(1964:97) wrote: ‘The continuity of the hierarchy offers hope 
that by systematic, step by step comparisons the gap between 
molecules and large animals can be bridged.’ Almost two 
decades later, a book appeared with the title: Evolution from 
molecules to men (see ed. Bendall 1983).
 
Two significant reactions have also recently emerged. Firstly, 
the New Scientist magazine (2004) published a collective 
statement from 405 natural (physical science) scientists in 
the field of physics and related disciplines under the title: 
‘An open letter to the scientific community.’ The scientists 
commence their reaction with the following paragraph:
The big bang today relies on a growing number of hypothetical 
entities, things that we have never observed – inflation, dark 
matter and dark energy are the most prominent examples. 
Without them, there would be a fatal contradiction between 
the observations made by astronomers and the predictions 
of the big bang theory. In no other field of physics would this 
continual recourse to new hypothetical objects be accepted as 
a way of bridging the gap between theory and observation. It 
would, at the least, raise serious questions about the validity of 
the underlying theory. (2004:para. 1)
Furthermore, they advance substantial scientific concerns, 
including complaining about the intolerance of differences of 
opinion, publications and research funding.1 
Secondly, a website with the name A scientific dissent from 
Darwinism (http://www.dissentfromdarwin.org/) 12 June 
2011 states: 
We are skeptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and 
natural selection to account for the complexity of life. Careful 
examination of the evidence for Darwinian theory should be 
encouraged. (Discovery Institute 2008)
In a similar manner to the New Scientist argument, the fourth 
point in a list of frequently asked questions (FAQ) on this 
website, reads:
In recent years there has been a concerted effort on the part 
of some supporters of modern Darwinian theory to deny the 
existence of scientific critics of Neo-Darwinism and to discourage 
open discussion of the scientific evidence for and against Neo-
Darwinism. The Scientific Dissent From Darwinism statement 
exists to correct the public record by showing that there are 
scientists who support an open examination of the evidence 
relating to modern Darwinian theory and who question whether 
Neo-Darwinism can satisfactorily explain the complexity and 
diversity of the natural world. (Discovery Institute 2008)
The last FAQ listed is, ‘Are there credible scientists who 
doubt Neo-Darwinism?’ Their answer reads:
1.They say that ‘in cosmology today doubt and dissent are not tolerated, and young 
scientists learn to remain silent if they have something negative to say about the 
standard big bang model. Those who doubt the big bang fear that saying so will 
cost them their funding… Today, virtually all financial and experimental resources in 
cosmology are devoted to big bang studies. Funding comes from only a few sources, 
and all the peer-review committees that control them are dominated by supporters 
of the big bang. As a result, the dominance of the big bang within the field has 
become self-sustaining, irrespective of the scientific validity of the theory’ (New 
Scientist 2004:paras. 6, 8).
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Yes. Signers of the Scientific Dissent From Darwinism hold 
doctorates in biological sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics, 
medicine, computer science, and related disciplines from such 
institutions as Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Dartmouth, 
Rutgers, University of Chicago, Stanford and University of 
California at Berkeley. Many are also professors or researchers at 
major universities and research institutions such as Cambridge, 
Princeton, MIT, UCLA, University of Pennsylvania, University 
of Georgia, Tulane, Moscow State University, Chitose Institute 
of Science & Technology in Japan, and Ben-Gurion University in 
Israel. (Discovery Institute 2008)
Apart from these dissenting voices within the current 
situation of these disciplines, it should be remembered 
that 20th century physics includes classical determinism 
(Bohm, Einstein, Schrödinger and the school of De Broglie), 
the mechanistic main tendency of classical physics (last 
represented by Heinrich Hertz) and the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohr and Heisenberg). 
Likewise, 20th century biology diverges into distinct and 
mutually exclusive schools of thought. Just consider the 
mechanistic orientation (Eisenstein), the physicalistic 
approach (neo-Darwinism), neo-vitalism (Driesch, Haas, 
Heitler, Rainer Schubert-Soldern, Sinnott – continued in 
recent theories of complexity and intelligent design), 
holism (Adolf Meyer-Abich and Jan Smuts), emergence 
evolutionism (Bavinck, Lloyd-Morgan, Polanyi, Woltereck) 
and pan-psychism (Teilhard de Chardin, Bernard Rensch).
Referring to these facts is important because it demonstrates 
the (abovementioned) relativity of scholarly endeavours even 
within the natural sciences. Merely studying the history of 
any discipline irrevocably challenges the pretentions of 
‘universal reason’. 
Some crucial problems entailed in 
neo-Darwinism
Darwin did not attempt to give an account of the origination 
of the first living entities. At the end of his Origin of Species 
he actually used the kind of language found in the long-
standing vitalistic tradition within biology, dating back to 
Aristotle. According to vitalism, ‘life’ is an immaterial force 
acting upon lifeless matter. Darwin ([1859a] 1968:459−460) 
wrote: ‘There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several 
powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator 
into a few forms or into one.’ The constantly increasing 
natural scientific knowledge regarding the complexity of 
the smallest living entities makes it all the more difficult to 
provide a rational account of the supposed origination of 
living entities. Whilst Darwin still reverted (inconsistently) 
to a ‘life-breathing’ Creator, present-day neo-Darwinists, for 
the sake of their physicalistic starting point, simply proceed 
from the assumption that living entities indeed ‘evolved’ 
from non-living material configurations, most probably ‘self-
duplicating’ molecules. Any subsequent attempt to explain 
the transition from the non-living to the living then becomes 
circular, because the ultimate conviction is already in place: 
living things did in fact evolve from non-living things. Such 
a position is illogical because it begs the question. It is a good 
example of a petitio principii where one accepts as a given 
what one wants to demonstrate.
Initially, the emphasis was on the so-called ‘building blocks’ 
of living things, directed at DNA molecules, and soon it was 
clear that the ‘hardware’ needs the ‘software’, the information 
(entailed in the genetic code). Yet, the random origination of 
this information runs into serious statistical problems, apart 
from the fact that DNA and protein mutually presuppose 
each other. 
Furthermore, we know that the 20 different amino acids serve 
as the basis for multiple enzymes responsible for catalysing 
reactions in the various metabolic pathways within the cell 
(there can be up to 100 000 enzymes in a single cell). One such 
an enzyme, phosphatase, catalyses reactions taking place in 
a hundredth of a second – reactions that otherwise (in the 
absence of this enzyme) would take a trillion years (see Lang 
2003; Sarfati 2010:241).
Adenosine triphosphate (ATP – the energy currency of the 
cell as it is also called) synthase is the smallest motor in the 
world. Sarfati (2010) remarks: 
This motor is unique in that it uses electricity to turn a rotor, 
which squeezes two components of ATP (ADP and phosphate) 
at high enough energy to form ATP. Then it throws off the ATP 
and prepares to accept new ADP and phosphate. This motor 
turns at about 10,000 revolutions per minute, and each rotation 
produces three ATP molecules. (p. 242)
Attempting to explain the origination of this motor, viewed 
as the result of random interactions between atoms and 
molecules, exceeds all odds. It is undoubtedly an instance 
of a complex biotic motor (organ) that cannot be explained 
in terms of incremental, slight changes, sufficient to answer 
to a condition according to which Darwin’s whole theory 
would break down. Darwin (1859b:109) wrote: ‘If it could be 
demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could 
not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, 
slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break 
down.’ Perhaps the most amazing feature of these little 
motors is that there are so many of them within the human 
body. Using many trillions of these motors, the human body 
generates every day ATP equivalent to the mass of the human 
body (see Sarfati 2010:242).
Darwin’s ambiguous position 
regarding progress
Darwin truncated the term ‘evolution’ by eliminating its 
inherent biotic connotations. With the rise of an investigation 
of the physical-chemical substrate of living entities, this 
legacy supported the newly introduced terminology, for 
natural scientists started to speak of ‘molecular biology’. 
From the perspective of his organismic biology, Von Bertalanffy 
(1973) reacted by emphasising the difference between atoms, 
molecules and macromolecules on the one hand and living 
entities on the other. Because molecules, as such, are not alive, 
they cannot display vital properties such as being healthy, 
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ill or dying. From a thermodynamic (physical) perspective, 
the cell prevails in a state of the highest improbability. 
When the physical-chemical basis (substratum) of living 
things approaches a state of higher statistical probability 
(equilibrium), the increase of biotical instability anticipates 
the ultimate biotic process of dying. Von Bertalanffy (1973) 
radically rejects all reductionistic attempts aimed at an 
elimination of the biotic aspect of reality when it comes to 
an appreciation of the vital functioning (vital processes) of 
living entities:
These processes, it is true, are different in a living, sick or dead 
dog; but the laws of physics do not tell a difference, they are not 
interested in whether dogs are alive or dead. This remains the 
same even if we take into account the latest results of molecular 
biology. One DNA molecule, protein, enzyme or hormonal 
process is as good as another; each is determined by physical 
and chemical laws, none is better, healthier or more normal than 
the other. (p. 146)
Gould (1996:139) mentions that whilst natural selection talks 
only about ‘adaptation to changing local environments’ it 
does not include any ‘statement whatever about progress’. 
Nor ‘could any such claim be advanced from the principle of 
natural selection’. Analogous to what Von Bertalanffy said, 
Gould (1996) explains:
The woolly mammoth is not a cosmically better or generally 
superior elephant. Its only ‘improvement’ is entirely local; the 
woolly mammoth is better in cold climates (but its minimally hairy 
ancestor remains superior in warmer climates). Natural selection 
can only produce adaptation to immediately surrounding (and 
changing) environments. No feature of such local adaptation 
should yield any expectation of general progress (however such 
a vague term be defined). Local adaptation may as well lead to 
anatomical simplification as to greater complexity. (p. 139)
Acknowledging merely immediate fit provided no grounds 
for ‘increments of general progress or complexification’ 
and Gould (1996:140) appreciates Darwin in this regard as 
an intellectual radical who has a vision of the ‘history of life 
devoid of predictable progress’ – but this ‘proved too much 
for his Western compatriots to accept’. Although politically 
liberal, Darwin was comfortably settled in a conservative 
segment of British society. According to Gould, this is the 
only explanation for the hybrid nature of Darwin’s claims, for 
upholding on the one hand that natural selection inherently 
does not contain any bias towards progress and, at the same 
time, speaking of progress towards perfection on the other, is 
simply contradictory – being at once ‘the intellectual radical 
and the cultural conservative’ (Gould 1996:145). And:
moreover, Darwin enjoyed this comfort in a society that, more 
than any other in human history, had enshrined progress as the 
fundamental doctrine of its meaning and being—Victorian Britain 
at the height of industrial and colonial expansion. How could a 
patrician Englishman, at the very apex of his nation’s thundering 
success, abjure the principle that embodied this triumph? And 
yet, natural selection could produce only local adaptation, not 
general progress. (p. 140−141)
What Gould did not consider in this context is that Darwin’s 
a priori commitment to the continuity postulate of modern 
(humanistic) philosophy in a subtle way provided him 
with the trust (certainty) that although natural selection 
does not spell progress, the fossil record will fill the gap(s!). 
Unfortunately, it was precisely the dominance of gaps in 
the fossil record that contradicted his expectations and 
predictions, as well as the current discontinuous state of the 
world of living entities (sometimes designated as the Natural 
System). His firm belief was that ‘natural selection acts solely 
by accumulating slight, successive, favourable variations’, in 
line with the canon ‘Natura non facit saltum’ [Nature does not 
make jumps] (Darwin [1859a] 1968:307).
He applied this faith in the continuity of descent (and its 
instantiation in natural selection) to the fossil record and 
paleontological findings – just look at his explicit statement:
But just in proportion as this process of extermination has acted 
on an enormous scale, so must the number of intermediate 
varieties, which have formerly existed, be truly enormous. 
Why then is not every geological formation and every stratum 
full of such intermediate links? Geology assuredly does not 
reveal any such finely-graduated organic chain; and this, 
perhaps, is the most obvious and serious objection which can 
be urged against the theory. (Darwin [1859a] 1968:196)
At this point we may return to the abovementioned words of 
Darwin: ‘There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several 
powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into 
a few forms or into one’ (Darwin [1859a] 1968:459−460). We 
have noted that, in addition, Darwin’s (inconsistent) view 
also reflects the 18th century ideal of progress (and perfection) 
which prevailed in the conservative layer of British society 
within which Darwin found himself: ‘And as natural 
selection works solely by and for the good of each being, 
all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress 
towards perfection’ (Darwin [1859a] 1968:459).
The impasse of a physicalist 
materialism
Roy Clouser (2006:35) explains that for the materialist ‘reality 
is ultimately physical, so that everything is either matter 
or dependent upon matter’. A strange instance of such an 
orientation is found in a recent work of Stephen Hawking 
(2010), who claims: 
Because there is a law such as gravity, the universe can and will 
create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason 
there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, 
why we exist. (Hawking & Mlodinow 2010) 
The well-known formulation of Newton’s law of gravity 
states that the force of gravity F is directly proportional to 
the product of the masses of the attracting bodies (m
1
 and 
m
2
) and indirectly proportional to the square of the distance 
between them (r2 – with G as a constant). Of course, we have 
to note that a law is not something independent, because it 
is fitted within the context of other laws and it is correlated 
to what is subject to it as a law. Reifying the law of gravity 
to the level of an independent origin of the universe breaks 
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apart its intrinsic coherence with the diversity of creation 
and with those creatures subject to it – and in doing this it 
strips such an isolated law from its meaning. But apart from 
the presupposed correlation between law and subject, any 
law formulation therefore always presupposes more than 
the physical aspect of reality. Mass, for example, is a physical 
quantity whilst distance reflects the meaning of space. The idea 
of a constant cannot be conceived apart from the kinematic 
aspect with its core meaning of uniform flow (constancy). 
Finally, the concept force is derived from the physical aspect. 
In other words, the formulation of the law of gravity brings to 
expression the unbreakable coherence between the physical 
aspect and those non-physical aspects lying at its foundation 
within the order of creation.
Moreover, the materialist has to face other serious problems. 
If everything is material, then nothing material can exist, 
because the conditions making the existence of material 
things possible are not themselves material and are therefore 
non-existent. The conditions for being material are not 
material. Furthermore, the statement that everything is material 
pretends to be true. But truth is not material, for which are 
the atoms and molecules constituting the truth of the basic 
statement of materialism? The same applies to any falsehood.
The status of (physical) laws presents itself as the Achilles’ 
heel of materialistic physicalism, because the conditions for 
the existence of something cannot be derived from that which 
meets these conditions. The conditions for being an atom 
are not themselves an atom, just as little as the conditions 
for being green are themselves green. The boundary process 
of the Big Bang is described in spatial (‘dense’) and physical 
(‘heat’) terms which presuppose physical and spatial laws. The 
abovementioned alternative recently proposed by Hawking, 
namely that the law of gravity will create the universe, 
acknowledges an element of the dilemma contained in the 
idea that what meets or conforms to a law could be seen as 
the source of the law. Yet, Hawking simply reverted to an 
equally objectionable position by elevating the law itself to 
become the origin of what is subjected to it. Acknowledging 
the correlation of law and subject does not entail that either 
could be deduced from the other.
From our brief analysis of the law of gravity it is also clear 
that no single kind of law ‘stands on its own’ for the physical 
aspect of reality presupposes the aspects of number, space 
and movement, each with their own unique laws. In fact 
the meaning of the physical aspect is constituted by its 
interconnections with non-physical aspects. For example, the 
first main law of thermodynamics, traditionally designated 
as the law of energy conservation, should actually be called the 
law of energy constancy, which is a kinematic retrocipation 
(backward-pointing analogy) to the original meaning of the 
kinematic aspect of uniform (constant) motion.
From natural laws to norming 
principles
In distinction from natural laws, human life is ruled by 
norming laws, known as principles (or norms). On the basis 
of logical principles, scholarly activities are concerned 
with distinguishing between truth and what is false. This 
distinction presupposes an accountable free will, enabling 
responsible decisions. Therefore the crucial question here 
concerns the status of normativity. Although we may differ 
about what is legal and illegal, polite and impolite, frugal 
and wasteful, and so on, it cannot be denied that in these 
oppositions we meet logical contraries. Once normativity, in 
this sense, is acknowledged one can account both for norm-
conformative and antinormative human actions.
This normativity of life underlies the mystery of sin – through 
which the possibility of disobeying God became an actuality. 
Because illogical thinking is still a form of thinking, namely 
antinormative thinking, we cannot escape from the God-given 
ordinances, because also in Christ is the order for logical (and 
illogical) thinking maintained. Without (at least implicitly) 
applying the yardstick of logical norms it would indeed be 
impossible to know what something illogical is. Orderliness 
and disorderliness point towards God’s law. If God did not 
control and/or maintain and/or keep and/or sustain logical 
laws (the creation order for logical thinking), neither obedient 
nor disobedient (norm-conformative or antinormative) 
thinking would have been possible. The human subject 
is the accountable point of reference – in obedience and 
disobedience. Maintaining the creation order after the fall 
does not eliminate the normed human freedom of choice. For 
this reason God’s sovereignty and human accountability are 
not in conflict.
The appeal of God’s norming law has exerted its effect 
throughout the existence of humankind, but it was not 
acknowledged as such, at least not within the most 
dominant intellectual traditions. Plato already discovered 
the constancy of God’s law in his response to the Heraclitian 
emphasis on flux, because if everything changes there would 
be no steadfast handles for conceptualising to hold on to. The 
speculative theory of transcendent, eternal and immutable 
ideas, advanced in Plato’s early dialogues (such as Gorgias 
and Phaido), was made immanent in the thought of Aristotle, 
where these ideas surfaced as the universal substantial forms 
of things. In doing this, Aristotle stumbled upon the universal 
side of individual entities, their orderliness or law-conformity. 
At the same time, Plato and Aristotle provided the basis for 
the realistic metaphysics of medieval philosophy in which 
universals (universalia) were supposed to have a threefold 
existence, namely, (1) ante rem in God’s mind, (2) in re within 
things (as copies of the ideas in God’s mind) and (3) post rem 
as the universal subjective concepts within the human mind. 
According to this view, the platonic ideas in God’s mind 
(which therefore exist prior to what we can observe in the 
world of becoming), are copied into the creatures as their 
universal substantial forms. These ideas are also appreciated 
as thoughts or concepts within God’s mind. Interestingly, 
the influence of this metaphysical view is clearly found in 
reformed theology. For example, during the centenary 
festivals of the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher 
Education held at Potchefstroom in 1969, one of the main 
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speakers (a member of the University Council, Dr Postma) 
defended the view that the task of a Christian university is 
to think God’s thoughts, as they are found in creatures, after 
him.
Eliminating God’s law: The 
implications of modern Humanism
The challenge to the reigning medieval metaphysics came 
from the late Scholastic movement of nominalism, which 
denied both the universalia ante rem and the universalis 
in re – that is to say, both God’s law for creatures and the 
orderliness of creatures. But when every ‘order for’ (‘order-
determination of’) is eliminated, factual reality turns into 
chaos. This happened at a time when, during the Renaissance, 
modern Humanism emerged in its urge to proclaim human 
beings as self-determining, as autonomously free. The ideal to 
become a law-for-oneself stretched itself out beyond human 
subjectivity, because it embraced also the structureless 
(chaotic) reality out there. In his discussion of the thought 
of Descartes, Von Weizsäcker (2002) reveals a penetrating 
understanding of this orientation: 
This state of affairs is characteristic of modernity. It is not the 
world in which I find myself that guarantees my existence. This 
guarantee is not lost, for when I recover the world then it is as 
the object of my self-assured thinking, that is to say, as an object 
which I can manipulate.2 (p. 130−131)
This manipulation of the ‘world’ soon gave rise to the ideal 
of logical creation. Truth is no longer seen in terms of the 
realistic yardstick (as the correspondence of thought and 
reality – adequatio intellectus et rei), because it merely concerns 
the compatibility of concepts. Ernst Cassirer (1971:56) captures 
this stance as follows: ‘Truth does not inhere in the things, 
but belongs to the names and their comparison, as it occurs 
in statements.’3 Kant carried this new motive to its extreme 
rationalistic consequences.4 
Already in the early development of modern philosophy, 
nominalism inspired Descartes to view number and all 
universals as mere ‘modes of thought’ (Principles of Philosophy, 
part I, LVII). During the 17th and 18th centuries, this idea was 
radicalised. Particularly, the procedure followed by Galileo 
in formulating his famous law of inertia exerted a strong 
influence on the way in which Kant elaborated this idea in 
his view of thought categories. In his famous 1638 treatise on 
‘two new sciences’, Galileo used a historically significant 
thought experiment (see Galilei [1638] 1973). He contemplated 
2.In its orginal German: ‘Dies ist ein charakteristisch neuzeitlicher Sachverhalt, Nicht 
die Welt, in der ich mich vorfinde, garantiert mein Dasein. Diese Garantie geht 
nicht verloren, und wenn ich die Welt wiederfinde, dann als Gegenstand meines 
selbstgewissen Denkens und darum als Objekt, das ich hantieren kann’ (Von 
Weizsäcker 2002:130–131).
3.In its orginal German: ‘Die Wahrheit haftet nicht an den Sachen, sondern an den 
Namen und an der Vergleichung der Namen, die wir im Satze vollziehen: veritas in 
dicto, non in re consistit’ (cf. De Corpore, part I, ch. 3, paras.7–8, cited by Cassirer 
1971:56). The similarities with Rorty’s position are obvious!
4.If one defines rationalism as a reification of conceptual knowledge (in terms of 
universal traits) and irrationalism as a reification of what is unique and individual 
(i.e. the reification of concept-transcending knowledge or idea-knowledge), then 
it is clear that nominalism displays a hybrid nature, being at once rationalistic and 
irrationalistic – rationalistic in respect of the universal concepts within human 
reason and irrationalistic regarding the strictly individual nature of the world 
outside the human mind.
the movement of a body in motion, on a path extended into 
the infinite, and then argued that this body will continue 
its motion on this path indefinitely if nothing impedes its 
motion (friction, e.g.). Holz (cf. 1975:345−358) argues that 
the way in which Galileo formulated this principle of inertia 
strongly influenced Kant. Kant now assigned a remarkable 
capacity to human understanding. If Galileo can simply 
formulate a thought experiment on the basis of the spontaneous 
subjectivity of human thinking and then deduce a natural law 
from this mere thought experiment – namely the kinematical 
law of inertia – and subsequently apply it to moving things 
in nature, then this must entail that there are a priori elements 
in our knowledge before all experience. What impressed Kant 
even more is that these a priori elements in the human mind 
actually make possible our knowledge of reality in the first 
place.
This prompted Kant to claim that these laws are not derived 
from nature. Rather, by employing categories of thought, 
human understanding prescribes them to nature in an a priori 
way. This embodies what became known as the Copernican 
turn in modern epistemology, namely ascribing primacy no 
longer to the object, but to the thinking human subject.
In a somewhat different context, Kant ([1787] 1956:122) 
wrote about the difficulty involved in this turn, namely how 
‘subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that 
is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge 
of objects’. Kant advanced the radical humanistic conclusion 
– the laws of nature are a priori contained in the subjective 
understanding of the human being: 
•	 The categories are conditions of the possibility of 
experience and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of 
experience (Kant [1787] 1956:161).
•	 The categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori 
to appearances and therefore to nature, the sum of all 
appearances (Kant [1787] 1956:163).
•	 Understanding creates its laws (a priori) not out of nature, 
but prescribes them to nature (Kant [1783] 1969:320, §36). 
Human understanding is thus promoted to function as the 
(a priori) formal lawgiver of nature in a universally valid way.
However, soon this position had to suffer from the relativity 
introduced by emphasising unique historical events. This 
focus emerged during the early 19th century, along with the 
rise of historicism. The assumed universally valid construction 
of reality by the human subject thus eventually became 
a victim of the relativistic consequences of this historicism. 
Combined with the so-called linguistic turn (by the end of 
the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century) this 
process opted for a personally or socially constructed world – 
each person or each society constructs its own unique life-
world. If the emphasis falls upon language, the additional 
qualification is that every person or society gives its own 
meaning to the world. The titles of the following books 
underscore this development: The social construction of reality: 
A treatise in the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckmann 
1969) and Der sinnhafte aufbau der sozialen welt [The meaningful 
construction of the social world] (Schutz [1932] 1974).
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As a consequence, we can speak about a general shift from 
concept to meaning, from thought to language. Introduced by 
Wilhelm Dilthey before the end of the 19th century, this 
transition is still popular a hundred years later. In a book 
on Knowledge and Postmodernism: In historical perspective, the 
combined ‘Introduction’ says that the most recent spiritual 
climate is marked by a ‘shift’ away from ‘documentation to 
interpretation, away from reconstructing a chain of events to 
exploring their significance ... Using a conceptual shorthand, 
we could say that meaning has replaced cause as the central 
focus of attention’ (Appleby et al. 1996:1).
This shift, known as the linguistic turn, represents a new 
epistemic ideal, following the conceptual rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and the historicism of the 19th century. 
However, in addition to the relativistic effects of historicism, 
it explored the ambiguities entailed in the emphasis of 
linguisticality. Particularly in what is currently known as 
Postmodernism, the combination of historicism and the 
linguistic turn gave birth to a reinforced relativism, because 
linguistic ambiguity and the necessity of constantly changing 
interpretations were superimposed upon historical relativity.
It found an ally in the neo-Kantian Baden school (Rickert, 
Weber and Windelband). Although this school started 
with absolute and timeless values, it soon reverted to a 
position where factual (societal) reality was stripped from 
its normativity. This normativity was then transposed into 
the new broad category of culture, which had to give shelter 
to norms, values, meanings and symbols. But all the elements 
placed within the basket of culture were the constructions of 
human subjects. Throughout this entire process it was not 
realised that the three successive epistemic ideals of the past 
three centuries remain bound to underlying universal and 
constant conditions that make humankind, as such, possible. 
Logicality, historicity and linguisticality are all universal 
features conditioning, amongst others, all human beings.
Postmodernism attempts to negate universality, but it 
does not recognise the implicit universality entailed in 
such statements of rejection. When, from a postmodern 
perspective, it is asserted that ‘everything is contextual and 
everything is interpretation’, it occurs easily that the implicit 
universality present in the qualification ‘everything’ is 
overlooked. Kreitzer (2007) raises this issue in response to the 
postmodern strategy of Van Huyssteen aimed at avoiding 
both foundationalism and relativism (see Van Huyssteen 
1999:63): ‘Unfortunately, Van Huyssteen does not see the 
logical contradiction. He “knows” (a universal truth claim) 
that all knowledge is interpreted merely within a parochial 
group’ (Kreitzer 2007:7). Any (postmodern) statement 
containing the term ‘all’ in its negation of universality is self-
referentially incoherent, because what it wants to deny is 
presupposed by its mode of formulation.
The assertion of historicism that historical change takes place 
at the cost of constancy continued to plague the postmodern 
discourse. Plato already realised that change can only be 
established on the basis of persistence (constancy). This 
insight was further explored by Galileo and Einstein. The 
law of inertia formulated by Galileo is based upon the 
core kinematic meaning of constancy and the same applies 
to Einstein’s special theory of relativity which, in the first 
place, is a theory of constancy, asserting that all movement 
is relative to the velocity of light c in a vacuum (see Strauss 
2011). We noted earlier that the law of energy constancy 
reflects the intermodal coherence between the foundational 
kinematic aspect and the physical aspect. This coherence also 
shows that change presupposes constancy and this insight 
supports our critique of Postmodernism with its emphasis on 
change at the cost of constancy.
Rationality and the task of Christian 
scholarship
The idol of a universal reason did not withstand the test of 
time, for, since ancient Greece, we have witnessed radical 
differences both within the domain of philosophy and 
within the special sciences (the natural sciences and the 
humanities). The multiple ismic orientations and the equally 
numerous antinomies flowing from them are the result of 
reifying certain aspects or parts of reality. For this reason, 
the first task of Christian scholarship is to honour God as 
Creator and Sustainer of creation and to avoid the apostate 
urge to find rest in some or another part or aspect of creation 
which is then elevated to become the exclusive principle of 
explanation of the whole universe. The challenge is nothing 
less but pursuing the path of a non-reductionist ontology. It 
presupposes the distinction between God and creation, as 
well as a thorough understanding of the distinction between 
law and subject.
Not only philosophy but also all the academic disciplines 
have to use a concept of law and subject. Discovering and 
analysing these laws should be undertaken by using the 
transcendental-empirical method, which is motivated by the 
central biblical motive of creation, fall and redemption. This 
central biblical revelation informs the idea that the creation 
order makes possible all the variable empirical phenomena 
that we can experience. The term transcendental here refers 
to the founding structure of God’s creation order, whilst 
the term empirical appeals to the variable phenomena of our 
experience in their integral meaning (i.e. not restricted to 
sensory experience). Since the Renaissance, the motive of 
logical creation entered the scene and it gave birth to the 
idea that the world itself has a rational structure. However, 
from a Christian point of view, one can rather say that the 
universe is intelligible, but not that it is rational. For example, 
the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism claimed that our 
experience of legal relations is made possible by the concept 
of law, whereas, both our legal experience and concept of 
law presuppose the ontic (transcendental) structure of the 
jural aspect.
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In the Mededelingen of July 1950, Dooyeweerd rejects every 
conception of: 
a scriptural philosophy that looks for support in specific Bible 
texts for intrinsically philosophical and in general scholarly 
problems and theories. It actually merely boils down to ‘positing 
a few privileged issues’ about which the Bible would give 
explicit statements, while for the rest, where such special texts 
are not found, one at leisure can continue to fit into a mode of 
thinking driven by intrinsically un-biblical motives. (p. 3–4)
P. De B. Kock (1973) underscores the same point: 
We believe, however, with the philosophy of the cosmonomic 
idea, that religion (as pre-scientific root-dynamics) provides 
only orientation and direction to thought and that by it no single 
scientific problem is brought to a solution. (p. 12)
The transcendental-empirical method has an inherent 
dynamic openness:
•	 By virtue of the radical depth of sin, all human insights 
(also those discovered by applying the transcendental-
empirical method) remain provisional, fallible and open to 
improvement.
•	 The wealth of human experience is constantly deepened 
through science and technical advances, implying that 
every investigation, in the light of new information, can 
always be developed further, altered and even refuted.
•	 Therefore, academic disciplines, in accordance with 
the nature of scholarly reflection, must proceed to the 
boundaries of the limited human possibilities and, 
consequently, must always be aware of the limitations 
and modest about the insights obtained.
The two most important elements necessary for a continued 
development of the Reformational legacy of Christian 
scholarship are given in the tasks, (1) to articulate and 
investigate modal laws and type laws and (2) to investigate 
the analogical basic concepts and compound concepts 
employed in every discipline.
Since whatever there is within the universe, in principle, 
functions within all modal aspects - one can assert that 
modal laws display an unspecified universality, for they 
hold for whatever there is. However, the type laws holding 
for concrete entities and processes are only applicable to a 
specific type or kind of entities. For this reason their scope 
is restricted to a limited class of entities, explaining the 
specified universality discernable in all type laws. Every 
type law is still universal, in the sense that it holds for all the 
entities belonging to the type it delineates, but because not 
everything in the world belongs to this kind, its universality 
is restricted or specified. The law for being an atom holds for 
all atoms (its universality), but it does not hold for everything 
else (not everything is an atom – its specificity).
In addition, it should be noted that the diversity within 
creation exceeds the limits of logic. Assessing the logical 
soundness of arguments (their validity) is bound to the 
logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and the 
excluded middle. But already the principle of sufficient 
reason (ground) points beyond logic to the states of affairs in 
reality for which one has to account in a scholarly way. And 
once this ‘pointing-beyond’ is pursued, the ontic principle of 
the excluded antinomy enters the scene, safe-guarding us from 
the antinomies involved in every attempt to reduce what is 
truly irreducible (and ‘primitive’) to one or another reified 
perspective.5
Rationality can only fulfil its true calling when it accounts 
for the cohering diversity within reality without becoming 
a victim of any form of reductionism. This task cannot 
flourish apart from an ongoing dialogue with all the 
dominant trends of thought operating within philosophy 
and the various disciplines, because Christian scholarship 
constantly has to appreciate what was observed by other 
trends without surrendering to the possible one-sided 
and distorted perspectives in which such insights may be 
‘packaged’.6 Indeed, when Koers follows this guiding star it 
will continue to strengthen its invaluable contribution to the 
advancement of Christian scholarship – always allowing for 
a critical interaction with other trends of thought within the 
contemporary scholarly dispensation.
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